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Abstract. This paper proposes a conceptual model to support decision makers dur-
ing security analysis of Internet of Things (IoT) systems. The world is entering an
era of ubiquitous computing with IoT being the main driver. Taking into account the
scale of IoT, the number of security issues that are arising are unprecedented. Both
academia and industry require methodologies that will enable reasoning about secu-
rity in IoT system in a concise and holistic manner. The proposed conceptual model
addresses a number of challenges in modeling IoT to support security analysis. The
model is based on an architecture-oriented approach that incorporates sociotechni-
cal concepts into the security analysis of an IoT system. To demonstrate the usage
of the proposed conceptual model, we perform a security analysis on a small scale
smart home example.
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1. Introduction
An area that has attracted a lot of attention from research and industry alike is the Internet
of Things (IoT). The vision of IoT is not new but has existed since the early conception
of computer networks. Weiser, in 1991 [43], provides one of the most accurate yet simple
visions of IoT by stating that the most profound technologies merge with the environment.
He states that technology will be so evident that we will start perceiving it as a natural part
of life. IoT along with cloud computing promises to make that statement into a reality.
As IoT becomes more integrated into our daily lives, the concerns surrounding its se-
curity aspects are growing at an alarming rate. The research community has already iden-
tified a number of security challenges in many areas of IoT [6,14,18]. In terms of security,
a prominent concern is Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in embedded devices [40], since
such devices lack the resources to withstand repeated requests from malicious attackers.
Man-In-The-Middle attacks are another acknowledged issue [9] that take advantage of
either weak encryption algorithms of embedded devices or weak authentication mecha-
nisms among the systems [27]. Security researchers have found common vulnerabilities in
many IoT devices that could have been prevented if simple security measures were taken
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into consideration during the development cycle [36]. The practice of implementing secu-
rity analysis during development ensures that the final product will meet specific security
standards. The security standards, in turn, will ensure its robustness when the product is
actively deployed in real life scenarios. The method of including secure practices early
in the development cycle is advocated by the field of requirements engineering. Require-
ments engineering analysis is applied by identifying the stakeholders’ requirements in the
development cycle to produce security requirements [7].
IoT systems allow the network integration of a variety of different devices. Devices
such as personal computers, mobile phones, and printers can be considered traditional
devices since they have been used in networking scenarios in the past. Traditional devices
are used to access the Web, share files or host websites. Devices such as light bulbs, cars
or heart monitors are only now gaining networking capabilities and as a result they have
significant security flaws [39]. IoT is unique in the sense that it brings together old and
robust technology with new and untested technology. The pairing of mature technology
with immature technology naturally results in security issues. Given the unique challenges
faced by IoT systems, our main question in this paper is how a security engineer can
elicit security requirements in IoT systems? The previous question can be expanded to
the following research questions:
1. How can IoT systems be modeled in order for an engineer to elicit security require-
ments of the IoT system?
2. As IoT systems exhibit a high degree of interdependencies, which stakeholders are
responsible for satisfying each security requirement?
3. How can we support decision makers to select security controls in IoT systems?
The proposed conceptual model contributes to addressing the first of the above re-
search questions. It is going to be part of a security framework that will address all three
research questions. The components of the security framework will be the following:
1. Terminology: used to define the terms that describe the concepts of the proposed
security framework. The terminology will facilitate the reasoning about the security
of an IoT system by establishing a common language among security engineers.
2. Modeling language: provides components to create IoT system model that will cap-
ture the information needed by a security engineer in order to perform security anal-
ysis for an IoT system. Part of the modeling language will be the conceptual model
presented in this paper. Other parts of the language will be the language semantics
and language notation. The models created using the conceptual model will be able
to be expressed in both graphical and textual notation. The textual notation will be
used to facilitate computer aided analysis, while the graphical notation will be used
to assist in visual analysis.
3. Methodology: used to create model instances of an IoT system for security require-
ments elicitation by security engineers. The methodology will provide instructions as
well as restrictions on how modeling instances are created using the modeling lan-
guage.
4. Analysis: the process of eliciting information from model instances. A form of anal-
ysis is the modeling of threats that impact model instances along with the assets that
need to be protected. Other types of analysis will include the verification of the pro-
posed security mechanisms along with the propagation of threats based on the com-
promised nodes of the IoT system.
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The conceptual model enables reasoning about security in IoT systems using infor-
mation retrieved by studying the hardware architecture of an IoT system. The proposed
model is based on our previous work [31], which models the hardware architecture of
an IoT system with its core concepts being the IoT node and the network connection.
The architecture of a system offers valuable information for security analysis, such as the
supported protocols of network connections between nodes or the flow of data inside a
network domain. On the other hand, [31] does not express certain aspects of a system,
such as user interaction or authentication mechanisms. Thus, the proposed conceptual
model aims to address the limitations of a hardware architectural approach by introduc-
ing non-hardware architectural concepts along with hardware architectural concepts. Each
concept is grouped into different modules based on their thematic context, to allow a se-
curity engineer to only use the modules she needs. Since IoT has computer networking
components, concepts from computer networks such as network connections and network
domains as well as concepts from non domain specific modeling languages such as actor,
are incorporated in the proposed metamodel. The security requirements concepts of the
metamodel are based on the Secure Tropos method [33]. Secure Tropos was chosen be-
cause it is an established requirements engineering method whose security concepts align
with other requirements methods such as [16].
Our work here extends [31], by introducing:
– additional concepts to the metamodel that capture additional information from an IoT
system. For example, we introduce the concept of Net to express external networks
to an IoT system. Moreover, concepts that are introduced in the present metamodel
can be used to represent social constructs, such as users and stakeholders, or security
constructs, such as threats and vulnerabilities. Social concepts are used to model users
activity or behavior, while security concepts are used to model security issues.
– IoT systems are a network of various devices. Our initial attempt in [31] was to model
an IoT system in a similar manner to a computer network. In our present work, we
introduce concepts to express users, threat or security policies. Such concepts have
little relation to computer networks. For that reason, the proposed metamodel divides
its concepts into different modules based on their thematic context. Concepts that
are used to express network related constructs constitute the network module, while
security related concepts constitute the security module. A security engineer may
only need to model the network aspect of an IoT system. If that is the case, she only
needs to use concepts of the network module.
1.1. Outline
The structure of the paper is the following: Section 2 describes related work in the fields
of IoT, Security Requirements and Security Requirements in IoT. Section 3 presents the
proposed conceptual model, explains its concepts and describes its modular approach to
IoT security modeling. Section 4 displays a security analysis of a smart home using the
proposed metamodel. Section 5 discusses the future plans of this research and concludes
the paper.
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2. Related work
IoT, due to its magnitude and relatively young age, may be considered the technological
field with largest attack surface today [37]. The insecurity of IoT is demonstrated by a
large number of surveys that have identified a variety of security issues and challenges
found in IoT systems [1, 4, 20, 29]. However, there have been few attempts to address its
security issues from a security requirements point of view.
Some academic works identify security challenges in IoT while proposing future di-
rections that security researchers should take. For example, Kumar et al. conceptually
breaks down an IoT system into different layers and proceeds to identify the security
challenges of each layer and states the options that researchers have to prevent such is-
sues [24].
An attempt was made to provide a framework for security and privacy in IoT sys-
tems using requirements engineering by Alqassem [2]. They identify the complexity of
analyzing security in IoT systems and states that the key components in IoT are only
two: RFID systems and networks of sensors. To reason about security in IoT, they pro-
pose the use of the i∗ framework in order to undertake security analysis in future case
studies. In the paper, other technologies and topologies that are common in IoT systems,
are not considered. For example, IoT is not restricted to RFID systems but is able to use
any communication technology, such Wi-Fi, NFC or Bluetooth. Moreover, architectural
topologies are not restricted to networks solely comprised of sensors but may include any
type of device capable of using a network protocol.
IoT systems as a whole are composed of a multitude of devices. Many of those devices
are embedded devices. An informative paper from Gürgens illustrates a vision in applying
security engineering to embedded systems [15]. In their paper, they identify a number
of security challenges faced by embedded systems that should be addressed in order to
have a secure system. Furthermore, they reason that security requirements tools should be
designed and tailored to the needs of embedded systems.
Babar et al. propose a framework aiming to provide security in embedded IoT sys-
tems [5]. They propose a basic three-step security framework to elicit requirements in
embedded systems, by identifying the building blocks of embedded systems in IoT. Tian
et al. design a security framework specific to wireless sensor networks [41]. The frame-
work proposes a system architecture that is broken down into eight modules. Each module
has specific functionality to mitigate security issues. In summary, the presented works do
not view IoT in a comprehensive manner. They only aim to mitigate security issues in
specific domain areas. Accordingly, they cannot be used to offer a universal security anal-
ysis to any IoT scenario, but only aim to address specific instances of IoT systems. While
it is important to argue about domain specific IoT security issues, there is a need to reason
about IoT security in a holistic manner that does not limit a security engineer [35].
A number of issues and open challenges with the integration of IoT and Cloud com-
puting are identified by Díaz [8]. It is argued that IoT is only made possible through a
cloud infrastructure. Some IoT systems will use sensors as a service from a third party
provider, while other IoT systems may use cloud services to offload heavy processing
functions. Díaz states that IoT will function as a middle-ware that will transmit all its data
to the cloud for processing. The paper shows that the current trend for IoT application
development is based on Cloud computing.
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Ikram et al. [17] propose an alternative approach to modeling IoT. They argue that the
complexity of IoT can be modeled in a similar manner to chemical computing models.
Their work presents a chemical reaction-inspired computational model using the concepts
of graphs and reflection, which attempts to address the complexities associated with the
visualization, modeling, interaction, analysis and abstraction of information in the IoT.
Laghari et al. [26] model a self-adaptive architecture for managing the Carbon footprint
in a corporate environment using a heterogeneous multiagent system. They use Cogni-
tive Agent-based Computing (CABC) to create models. Both works propose concepts to
model social constructs. They were not designed to perform security analysis and as such
do not propose security related concepts.
ThingML is developed as a domain-specific modeling language which includes con-
cepts to describe both software components and communication protocols. The formalism
used is a combination of architecture models, state machines, and an imperative action
language [42]. ThinkML is supported by a set of open source tools that are built using the
Eclipse Modeling Framework. ThingML was developed to model the hardware, software
components and communication protocols of IoT systems. It does not have concepts to
model social or security components of IoT, such as users, stakeholders, threats or vul-
nerability.
ASSIST is an agent-based simulator of Social Internet of Thing (SIoT) [21]. The idea
behind SIoT is that smart objects will connect with each other to form social networks.
ASSIST uses an agent-based approach by defining three types of agents: Device Agents,
Human Agents, and Task Agents. While ASSIST can be used to express the social com-
ponents of IoT systems, it was not designed with security analysis is mind. As such it
cannot be used to express security components.
In their work, Ge et al. [11], proposed a framework for modeling and assessing secu-
rity in an IoT system. The framework has a graphical security model that evaluates the
level of security using specific security metrics. The security of an IoT system is assessed
in a comprehensive manner and in not limited to a specific IoT scenario, such as embed-
ded systems or RFID systems. Another framework that separates security requirements of
IoT systems depending on their architectural layer is made by Rahman et al. [34]. In their
work, they propose a four layer approach, with each layer having different security needs.
They state that their framework can be used by other researchers to build new security
solutions for IoT. In our work, we use a similarly comprehensive approach to security of
IoT systems although from a requirements engineering point of view.
3. The proposed conceptual model
In this work, we present a conceptual model for reasoning about security in IoT sys-
tems during the implementation phase. The development of the conceptual model draws
inspiration and uses similar concepts from a number of requirements engineering frame-
works [11, 12, 16, 33]. It is used to model the hardware, software and social components
of IoT systems in order to analyze their security. The hardware architectural components
of an IoT system are emphasized in the model. Using an architectural approach, an IoT
system can be analyzed in a similar manner as a traditional computer network. We use the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) definition of IoT, as “A global infrastruc-
ture for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical
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and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and commu-
nication technologies” [19].
The presented model extends our previous work on the APPARATUS framework [31].
The initial model of APPARATUS consisted of two concepts. The first concept was the IoT
Node and the second concept was the Network Connection. The IoT node was used to rep-
resent devices of IoT systems, while the Network Connection was used to represent how
the IoT nodes can communicate with each other. Using those two concepts we modeled
the hardware architecture of IoT systems in order to analyze their security.
In this work, we extend the model by introducing new concepts to represent social and
security components. The IoT node has been renamed to Device and additional concepts
have been introduced in order to represent the hardware components of the IoT system.
The metamodel is presented via a UML class diagram. Each class represents a concept
that can be used to describe specific objects of IoT systems. Each concept has a number of
properties that further describe it in the system. The UML diagram of the model is shown
in Fig. 1. The concepts of the presented model have been divided into different modules.
The metamodel consists of three modules:
1. Network module: is used to model network objects of IoT systems. The Network
module is considered the core module of the metamodel. Every other module is de-
signed as an extension to the Network module. This modeling choice was made to
give emphasis to the interconnecting nature of IoT systems. The Network module is
represented with the color blue in Fig. 1.
2. Social module: extends the Network module in an object-oriented manner with so-
cial concepts. Social concepts are used to model users and stakeholders. The social
module is represented with the color gray in Fig. 1.
3. Security module: extends the Network and Social modules with security concepts.
The security concepts are used to model threats, assets, security controls and attackers
in an IoT system. The concepts used by the Security module are heavily influenced
by Secure Tropos security concepts [12]. The security model is represented with the
color purple in Fig. 1.
The presented metamodel is used to model an IoT during at the implementation phase.
During the implementation phase, a security engineer has more detailed knowledge of an
IoT system. For example, during the implementation, the security engineer knows the type
of network protocols that are used by the system, the type, and versions of the devices that
provide services to the system. All the concepts of the metamodel, unless otherwise stated,
have the property of description which describes the concept in the system. The modules
of the implementation phase metamodel along with their concepts are the following:
Network Module
1. Device: the concept of Device was initially named IoT node in [31]. It is defined as a
hardware component of an IoT system. A restriction on the model is that Devices can
only have a single functionality. If a Device has more than one function, it has to be
represented as different Devices. For example, a laptop running a server (1st function)
and client (2nd function), has to be expressed as two separate virtual Devices that be-
long to a parent physical Device that is the laptop. The properties of the Device are:
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(1) aspect: declares whether the Device is a single node, or composed of sub-nodes.
The aspect physical means that a Device is a parent Device and may be composed
by more virtual Devices; (2) layer: the conceptual layer of the IoT architecture to
which the Device belongs. APPARATUS uses a three-layer architecture that consists
of the Application Layer, Network Layer and the Perception Layer [32, 44]. Other
works identify other architectures that provide more levels of abstraction. For exam-
ple, a SOA-based approach identifies five layers, application, service composition,
service management, object abstraction, objects [4]. Another approach by Lu, iden-
tifies other layers, that are application, middleware, coordination, backbone network,
existed alone network, access layer, edge technology [28]. The proposed architec-
tures for Internet of Things have yet to fuse into a single reference model [23], for
that reason we chose the three-layer approach. The three-layer approach provides the
necessary properties for reasoning about security while allowing to be extended if
more levels of abstraction are introduced into the final reference model of IoT. The
layers of IoT architecture should not be confused with the OSI model [25] since the
two models try to conceptualize different constructs and concepts. The layer concept
takes an enumerated value as input that is one of application, gateway, perception;
(3) type: defines the kind of the Device. A Device type may be a sensor, a mobile
phone or a server; (4) service: is the type of role or operation that the Device per-
forms for the network. This value may include network services such as ssh, ftp, data
processing filtering and relaying of data; (5) input: what is required in order for the
node to perform its role or operation. It takes an enumerated value as an input that is
drawn from dataEnvironmental, dataDigital, command, action, notification, trigger;
(6) output: is the result of the Device operation or role. It may take the same values
as the input property. (7) update: represents the process of how the software aspect of
the Device is being updated. The update can be automatic, require a specific action
or false.
2. Network Connection: the type of network communication protocol used between
the Devices. The properties of the network connection are: (1) description: the type of
connection, it can either be wireless, signifying a connection using a wireless protocol
or cable, signifying a connection using a wired medium. It takes an enumerated value
as an input; (2) listOfProtocols: is a list of the network protocols that are supported
by the network connection. It takes an array of string values as an input, each value
in the array represents a supported network protocol.
3. Micronet: represents environments that a security engineer can configure in terms of
their security. A Micronet is a managed environment that constitutes a collection of
Things necessary for an IoT system to perform a function. Examples of Micronets
are a smart home, an agricultural network of sensors or company’s internal network.
The properties of the Micronet are: (1) state: represents if the Devices in the Micronet
remain in the same location. The state can either be dynamic, meaning that the De-
vices in the network change network domains during their usage or static meaning
that the Devices in the system do not change network domains. Examples of dynamic
IoT systems are networks of vehicular fleets, drones, and other mobile devices since
devices in such networks move distances geographically. Examples of static IoT are
smart homes and industrial IoT systems since devices in such systems are stationary
during their usage.
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4. Net: represents external networks to the IoT system. While Micronet represents en-
vironments that have their security configured by a security engineer, Net represents
environments that their security configuration is not known. Examples of a Net are
external networks to the IoT system that a security engineer has little knowledge of,
such as a third party cloud infrastructure or hostile deployment environments. Dur-
ing security analysis, the Net is considered a hostile environment. Communication
between a Micronet and a Net is under the assumption that the Net is compromised.
5. Unidentified Node: is a Device that is not directly connected to a Micronet and a
security engineer has little knowledge of. It may be a malicious device or a legitimate
device that is not known by the system. For example, it can be an unauthenticated
laptop from a legitimate user trying to connect to an office network or it can be a
laptop operated by a malicious attacker trying to compromise the system.
6. Data: information that is produced or stored by a Device. Examples of Data is infor-
mation stored in a database or user passwords. The property of Data is: (1) location:
corresponds to the geographical location of the Data stored in the device. It can be
used to represent if Data are physically stored inside a network or are hosted by a
third party service. Moreover different regions have different laws regarding digital
information that ultimately affect the overall security of a system.
Social Module
1. Actor: is used to represent people or groups of people that interact with an IoT sys-
tem [12]. An Actor may be a stakeholder of the system. The concept of Actor can
be used to represent groups of people with different privileges, such as root users or
the administration personnel of a University. An Actor may never be malicious. To
represent malicious Actor, the concept of the Security Module, Malicious Actor is
used. The property of the Actor is the following: (1) intent: describes what an Actor
wants to achieve or gain by interacting with the IoT system.
Security Module
1. Malicious Actor: is a person with malicious intent. Malicious Actors are used to
representing attackers or insider threats. The concept of the malicious actor is a gen-
eralization of the concept Actor.
2. Asset: any Actor, Device or Data of the system that either (1) is considered valuable
by the stakeholders and needs to be protected; of (2) a malicious actor wants; or
(3) acts as a stepping stone for further attacks. Examples of Assets are the access
credentials known by an actor, sensitive user information stored in a database or a
sensor that has read/write privileges to a server.
3. Threat: a malicious function, or system that has the means to exploit a vulnerabil-
ity of a legitimate system. A Threat can only target an Asset of the IoT system. The
property of the Threat is: (1) threatType: represents the classification of the Threat ac-
cording to the STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure,
Elevation of Privilege) [38]. It takes an enumerated value.
4. Vulnerability: a software, hardware or usage policy weakness that can be exploited
by a Malicious Actor towards compromising an IoT system. Hardware and software
Vulnerabilities can be identified using techniques such as penetration testing.
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5. Constraint: a restriction related to security issues, such as privacy, integrity and avail-
ability, which can influence the analysis and design of an IoT system under develop-
ment by restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the
requirements of the system, or by refining some of the system’s objectives [12]. Con-
straint has the following property: (1) propertyType: how the Constraint is classified
according to the extended CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, Authoriza-
tion, Non-repudiation, Availability) [3]. It takes an enumerated value.
6. Mechanism: a Mechanism, when implemented, protects against one or more Vulner-
abilities.
Fig. 1. Metamodel of APPARATUS
Even though the metamodel can be used to produce valid modeling instances, there
are some design decisions that act as constraints. The design decisions are not visible in
the UML diagram. Hence, they are considered restrictions on the model instances. The
restrictions in the model instances are:
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Constraints on the Metamodel
1. If a Device has a more than one function, it has to be represented as a cluster of
Devices, with each Device in the cluster having a single function. This choice adds
more nodes in the model. For example, a Device with one hundred functions has to be
represented as 101 nodes. One node is used to represent the Device and the remaining
100 nodes are used to represent the functions of the Device. In terms of security, each
function is a potential vulnerability that has to be addressed. By having each function
represented as an individual node, other concepts can act upon the Device function
nodes to represent Threats, Mechanisms that are present in the system due to the
function of the Device. Another option to represent the different functions of a Device
would be to add multiple functions as attributes inside a single node that constitutes
the Device. Although it is a cleaner approach given the fact that it does not introduce
more nodes, other concepts cannot directly interact with individual functions but with
the node as a whole. For example, a vulnerability may result from a specific function
of a Device. The proposed mitigation mechanisms should only affect that specific
vulnerability. If the vulnerable function from the Device is removed, the same would
apply to the mitigation mechanism.
2. As demonstrated by the metamodel in Fig. 1 the concept of Threat can only target
the concept of Asset. Security analysis is only made on concepts that are considered
Assets by the stakeholders or the security engineer.
3. The properties that have enumerated values must only take one of the enumerated
values.
4. An Actor may never be malicious, but must only have legitimate intentions on using
an IoT system. Attackers or insider threats have to be represented by the concept of
Malicious Actor.
5. We consider IoT systems as systems deployed in hostile environments. The concept
of Net is used to represented systems that we cannot configure in terms of security.
As such they are considered compromised and malicious. On the other hand, Mi-
cronets represents systems whose components can be configured in terms of their
security. Since Micronets security can be configured, Devices communicating inside
Micronets share a level of trust. When a Device from a Micronet communicates with
an Unidentified Node from the Net it does so in the lowest level of the trust and al-
ways verifies the exchange. For security purposes, Micronets and Nets have a Zero
Trust Network architecture [22].
4. Apparatus concepts based on IoT system modeling
To illustrate how the proposed metamodel can be used, we will perform an illustrative
example of security analysis in an IoT system. In the interest of space, the example is
designed to showcase all of the features of the metamodel with the least components
possible. It is important to note that the security analysis presented is neither exhaustive
nor is a realistic security analysis of a network system. The allowed space does not permit
an in-depth security analysis. Instead of providing with a monolithic example of an IoT
system modeled using the metamodel’s concepts, specific instances of the system will be
shown. Each instance will be part of the IoT system with the aim of exhibiting specific
functionality of the metamodel. We have not yet developed a front end visual language
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for use by engineers. The analysis of the system will be done by creating UML model
instances of the IoT system shown in Fig. 2.
The scenario follows a young couple with a newborn baby. To monitor the baby’s
activity the couple installs a baby monitor that can be accessed from the Internet. The
system is composed of a baby monitor that functions as a camera, the Philips in Sight
B120/37 and Macbook laptop. The two devices have access to the Internet through a
NETGEAR R8500 router. The baby monitor can be accessed outside of the local network
through a third party service. The scenario is similar to commonly deployed IoT systems
found in domestic environments. A user buys the IoT equipment, installs it in his home
and controls it using a third party application. The processing or authentication is being
performed by a third party application on its servers, so in reality, it is a decentralized
network. Since the processing is taking place on the Cloud, the IoT system requires an
Internet connection in order to function properly.
The hardware components of the network are the following: (1) baby monitor, (2) router,
(3) laptop, (4) web server. The laptop can be used to view the camera feed from inside the
local network. To access the camera feed from outside the network a user must access the
camera through the third party web server. The web server is outside the private network
of the application and has to be accessed using an Internet connection, while the baby
monitor, router and laptop are connected to the same Local network of the user. In Fig. 2
the network layout of the IoT system is shown.
Fig. 2. Hardware components of the IoT system
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For our example, the stakeholders of the IoT system provide us with the following
security requirements:
SR1 Camera feed from the baby monitor should only be accessible by authorized users.
SR2 Devices of the smart home should be physically protected.
In order to group together Devices with specific functionality the concept of Micronet
is used. The smart home under analysis has one Micronet. The Devices of the Micronet
are the baby monitor, the laptop, and the router. During our security analysis, we make the
assumption that the Devices in the Micronet will remain connected to the same network
domain. To represent that assumption the Micronet has the property of state: static. The
web server that enables users to access the baby from outside the smart home’s local
network is part of the Net. Because we cannot configure the security of the web server
and have limited information about it, we represent the web server as an Unknown Node.
The Unknown Node is connected to the Net. In Fig. 3 we show the view of the high-level
components of the IoT system.
Fig. 3. Network and Social constructs of the IoT system
We identify the following Assets of IoT system:
A1 camera feed of the baby monitor.
A2 credentials to remotely access the smarts home’s router.
A3 physical aspect of the smart home’s Devices.
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The security analysis will be performed on the Micronet of the smart home. We ex-
press the components of the smart home using the Network and Social modules of the
metamodel as shown in Fig. 3. The smart home Micronet is composed of three Devices.
The Devices are a laptop, a baby monitor, and a router. The router provides the Micronet
with wireless connectivity, so each Device can communicate using a wireless medium.
For the purposes of the example, the only supported network protocols would be HTTP,
Telnet, and SSH. We represent a legitimate user with the intent of viewing the camera
feed as an Actor.
Due to the paper’s size limitations, instead of using a single model for our analysis,
we will create a separate model for each Asset. Normally, the analysis is performed in the
same model.
A1: camera feed of the baby monitor. To satisfy SR1 we specify an authorization Con-
straint on the users. The baby monitor is a Philips in Sight B120/37. The Asset that we
want to protect is the Data that is being transmitted by the baby monitor. By performing
a vulnerability search of that model we identify a direct browsing vulnerability, CVE-
2015-2884 1. The remote viewing stream is created by a proxy connection to the camera’s
internal web service via the cloud provider and is bound to a public hostname and port
number without credentials. The attacker can locate the hostname and port number and
access the camera feed. To mitigate the vulnerability we could create a rule to whitelist
the allowed users. The intent of the Malicious Actor is to view the camera feed. The model
of the security analysis is shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Threat modeling of A1
A2: credentials to remotely access the smarts home’s router. The router is a Device
that belongs to the gateway IoT layer. It acts as the bridge between the local network of
the smart home and the remaining of the Internet. If the router is compromised then an
1 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-2884
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attacker can access the camera feed of the baby monitor. To satisfy SR1 the router’s cre-
dential must be protected. The router’s model is NETGEAR R8500. Those models have
a password disclosure Vulnerability, the CVE-2017-5521 2. When trying to access the
web panel, a user is asked to authenticate; if the authentication is canceled and password
recovery is not enabled, the user is redirected to a page that exposes a password recov-
ery token. To mitigate the CVE-2017-5521, the proposed Mechanism is to update the
firmware of the Device. The router has the property update: action, meaning that a user
has to manually apply the update as shown in Fig. 5. The intent of the Malicious Actor, in
this case, is to access the router.
Fig. 5. Threat modeling of A2
A3: physical aspect of the smart home’s Devices. In Fig. 6, the Assets are the physical
aspect of the Devices of the smart home. Protecting those Assets is the SR2. The security
issue is that an attacker can physically access the Devices of the system. Physical access
allows an attacker a variety of attacks such as installing rootkits, backdoors, stealing data
and physically damaging the Devices. The Threat is the physical tampering of the de-
vices and the Vulnerability it exploits is that the devices are physically accessible by an
attacker. The Security Constraint that mitigates the Threat is that the devices of the system
should be physically protected. The proposed Security Constraint satisfies the SR2 and it
is implemented by the Mechanism of physically secure access to the devices. The idea is
that the system’s devices will be placed in a secure location that an attacker will not have
access to. The Threat of physical tampering is manifested by the Malicious Actor with
the intention of stealing the Devices.
The Constraints from Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 may be used to develop a security pol-
icy that each device in the Micronet must follow. Each component in the smart home’s
Micronet must adhere by the security policy imposed by the Constraints of the system.
2 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5521
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Fig. 6. Threat modeling of A3
If the stakeholders introduce a new Device in the smart home, Constraints in Fig. 7 must
be enforced in order for the system to be secure. For example, one of the enforced Con-
straints is to ensure the protection of the physical aspect of the Devices. When Devices
are introduced in the Micronet they must be physically protected.
In Table. 1 a presentation of the security concepts that were used, showing the Con-
straints, Mechanisms, Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Assets is presented.
Our aim with the provided examples was to only exhibit how models of IoT systems
can be used to elicit security requirements and perform threat analysis. For example, the
Threat of physical tampering on Devices has more implications that making a device
unavailable. An attacker can perform Man-In-The-Middle attacks, physically steal data
or deploy backdoors to the network. Similar issues present security challenges that need
to be addressed by a security engineer in order for an IoT system to be secure.
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Fig. 7. Security policy of smart home
Table 1. Presentation of security concepts of smart home
Asset
camera feed Device credentials Device physical aspect
Constraint
secure camera feed password disclosure Device physical protection
Threat
direct browsing protect Device credentials physical tampering
Mechanism
whitelist authorised users update Device Firmware physically secure access
Vulnerability
CVE-2015-2884 CVE-2017-5521 physically secure access
Information encoded in a model can be used to deduce security issues that would
not be otherwise apparent to a security engineer. The concept Data has the attribute of
location, that shows the physical location of the stored data. The information can be used
to understand the data flow of the network and the legal security requirements of data
since countries have different laws regarding digital information. The attribute state of
the Micronet, shows the movability of the system’s devices. For example, IoT systems
can be composed of vehicular fleets as well as stationary weather sensors. Moving devices
that change gateway layers often, will have different security requirements than stationary
devices. The attribute of type of the concept Device can be used as keywords to search
for Vulnerabilities in vulnerability databases. In the presented security analysis example,
we queried the CVE database for known vulnerabilities of two Devices in the smart home
based on the value of type. A security engineer could create a list of the values of the
property type and use it to query vulnerabilities databases for relevant vulnerabilities. The
more information a security engineer has, the more comprehensive her analysis would be.
An important issue in IoT is the existence of deployed vulnerable devices. Many of those
devices will never receive security updates due to the stakeholder’s inability to install them
or due to the manufacturers lack of support. The vast number of vulnerable IoT devices
is evident by million size botnets, such as the Mirai botnet. To model the ability of how
CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR IOT SECURITY ANALYSIS 17
a device can receive security updates, we introduce the update attribute in the concept of
Device. Certain devices will not be able to receive any security update and as such will be
vulnerable. If a device has the value of false in the update attribute it can be considered
compromised in the context of security analysis.
The concept of Network Connection has the attribute of type, which is used to repre-
sent whether the connection between two Devices is wireless or wired. In the majority of
cases, a wired connection is more secure than a wireless one since it is less prone to spoof-
ing attacks. Wired connections also have a longer transmission range than wireless ones.
Depending on the type a security engineer can propose different security mechanisms. For
example, wireless connections, even short range ones, require encryption mechanisms to
protect against replay attacks. Consider the case where an implanted heart defibrillator
communicates without any encryption to external devices. Any attacker will be able to
control it with fatal consequences. The other attribute of the Network Connection is the
supportedProtocols which holds an array of the supported networks of the connection.
In the presented example of the smart home, the supported network protocols were the
HTTP, TELNET, and SSH. HTTP and TELNET are unencrypted protocols that are sub-
ject to a variety of attacks, most commonly spoofing attacks. On the other hand, SSH is
a more secure protocol since it supports encryption by default. The knowledge of which
network protocols are used between devices is helpful to a security engineer in a number
of ways. For example, the NFC (Near Field Communication) has a range of 10cm. In
order for spoofing attacks to be successful, an attacker has to be in close proximity to the
target.
A design choice that may be considered a limitation is that security analysis can only
be made on components that are considered assets. The general consensus in security en-
gineering is that “a system is as strong as its weakest link”, and in the case of APPARATUS
it can be argued that a system can be compromised by a component that is not considered
an asset. One of the definitions of Asset in APPARATUS is that: (3) may act as a stepping
stone to further attacks. If a component can be used to compromise an IoT system, it is
considered an Asset and as such has to be secured.
5. Conclusion
Given the dynamic nature of IoT systems and their vast applications, it is expected that
their security specifications will differ from system to system. In the present paper, a con-
ceptual model to express IoT system for security analysis was proposed. The conceptual
model is used to create models to reason about security in IoT systems from a system’s
hardware architectural point of view. It consists of different modules, with each module
extending its security analysis capabilities when needed. The core module, called network
module, is used to map an IoT system in a similar manner to a computer network, by ex-
pressing its hardware architecture as a cluster of nodes in a network. In order to model
users and stakeholders, the social module was proposed, that extends the core network
module. Security concepts that allow security analysis were introduced in the security
module, that extends both the network and social modules. The security module, along
with information provided by the network and social modules are used to elicit security
requirements.
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To demonstrate how the concepts of the proposed metamodel can be used to model
an IoT system, we perform a security analysis in a smart home. The smart home was
composed of a baby monitor, a laptop, and a router. The smart home was modeled using
the metamodel’s concepts, with the smart home’s network diagram as a basis. Based on
the security requirements of the smart home’s stakeholders, we identified three threats
that impact the assets of the smart home. Based on the threats and the information of the
model instance, we identified specific vulnerabilities that exist in the system. We proposed
mechanisms to mitigate the vulnerabilities along with security constraints on the system
to further secure it. The identified security constraints were used to create a security policy
that was imposed on the system.
Future work aims to extend the metamodel with additional modules to enable other
types analysis. Currently, we are planning on introducing two modules. One such module
is the event module, that will introduce concepts more akin to event driven system secu-
rity to facilitate dynamic security analysis. Whereas another module will be the privacy
module, which will introduce privacy related concepts. Privacy in any context is not taken
into account in the current metamodel.
The metamodel is supported by a software application [30] named ASTo that facilitates
the security analysis of IoT systems. The application is hosted on Github under the MIT
license. It is based on Electron [13] and Cytoscape.js [10].
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